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NOMENCLATURE
χ2 value in the Chi-square distribution used to test for significant
differences between three (or more) independent groups when
using the Kruskall-Wallis non-parametric analysis of variance
where the dependent variable is measured on an ordinal scale. 
p probability of making a type I decision error.
z a value in the standard normal distribution that may be related
directly to a probability value to determine statistical signifi-
cance when using the Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks
test to establish if there is a statistically significant difference
between two related samples where the dependent variable is
measured on an ordinal scale.
1.0 INTRODUCTION
To improve flight safety, the Republic of China (ROC) Air Force
Headquarters routinely investigates all accidents and incidents.
Accidents attributable solely to mechanical failure have decreased
markedly but those attributable to human error have declined at a
much slower rate and remain the primary cause of accidents.
Operating a high-technology fighter aircraft is not only an issue of
skilled psychomotor performance but also of real-time decision
making involving situation awareness and risk assessment(1). 
The interservice procedures for instructional system development
(IPISD) adopts a systems perspective for the identification of needs and
the development of training to achieve a goal(2). This model, developed
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emergency situations presented in a full-flight simulator.
Furthermore, their decision making processes were examined in a
series of pencil-and-paper based tests. The results clearly showed
significant improvements in the quality of pilots’ situation
assessment and risk management (underpinning processes in pilot
decision making) although this was usually at the expense of speed
of response. Pilots used the quicker to apply SHOR mnemonic in
situations that which required a fast decision and the more compre-
hensive but slower to perform DESIDE method when there were
fewer time pressures. The results do strongly suggest that ADM is
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in the sequence of events leading up to an accident. By examining
and correlating information across a number of accidents, predictors
may be identified which may then be applied to individual crews or
situations in order to developing the effective prevention strategies.
Many human factors accident analysis frameworks, taxonomies and
analysis strategies have been devised over the years(5-9). The human
factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) is perhaps the
one most commonly used and best validated, and is the one used
herein as a basis for the identification of training needs. 
HFACS is a generic human error analysis framework originally
developed for US military aviation as a tool for the investigation of
the human factors aspects of accidents. HFACS is based on
Reason’s(10) system-wide model of human error in which active
failures are associated with the performance of front-line operators
in complex systems and latent failures are characterised as inade-
quacies or mis-specifications which lie dormant within a system and
are only triggered when combined with other factors to breach the
system’s defences. The development of HFACS is described in a
series of books and papers(4,11-16). However, as aviation accidents are
the result of a number of causes, the challenge for accident investi-
gators is how best to identify and mitigate the causal sequence of
events leading up to an accident. HFACS examines human error at
four levels. Each higher level affects the next downward level in the
framework (Fig. 1).
● Level-1 ‘Unsafe acts of operators’ is where the majority accident
investigations are focused. Such causes can be classified into the
two basic categories of errors and violation. 
● Level-2 ‘Preconditions for unsafe acts’ describes the latent
failures within the causal sequence of events as and the context
of the substandard conditions of operators and the practices they
adopt.
● Level-3 ‘Unsafe supervision’ traces the causal chain of events
producing unsafe acts up to the front-line supervisors.
● Level-4 ‘Organisational influences’ encompasses the most
elusive latent failures, the fallible decisions of upper management
which directly affects supervisory practices, as well as the condi-
tions and actions of front-line operators.
by the US military, provides a generalisable, context-free framework for
the development of training programmes. The IPISD approach divides
the development of training into five phases. These begin with identi-
fying training needs, so that the content of training can be specified
followed by a second phase specifying training objectives and mapping
out the structure of training programme. Phase three develops the
training contents into effective learning materials, which is followed by
the fourth phase implementing training programme. The final phase
evaluates the training intervention. The IPISD approach incorporates a
feedback loop enable to make revisions from the evaluation during all
five phases of training development. In this way the system of training
development is capable of modification and improvement(3).
This paper describes three related studies. The first study is
concerned with the identification of a specific training requirement
to equip cadet pilots in the ROC Air Force with aeronautical
decision making skills. This was achieved from the systematic
human factors analysis of 523 accidents using the human factors
analysis and classification system – HFACS(4). Study two is
concerned with the identification of potential training solutions,
based upon mnemonic-based aeronautical decision making methods,
and the subsequent design and development of a short training
course. The final study is concerned with the validation of the
efficacy of the training developed. After having received the training
developed, cadet pilots’ decision making skills were assessed in both
a series of flight simulator exercises and using a pencil-and-paper
based examination of their ability. 
2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF ADM TRAINING 
REQUIREMENTS
2.1 Introduction
There are a number of perspectives for describing and analysing
human errors, each based on different assumptions about the nature
of error and the underlying causal factors of the human contribution
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Figure 1. The HFACS framework, from Wiegmann & Shappell(4).
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saturation. ‘Crew resource management’ (CRM) issues, were the
next most frequent category, included poor teamwork, poor commu-
nication, failures of leadership and inadequate briefing. The
‘physical environment’ category, included poor responses to factors
such as, bad weather and terrain. The category of ‘physical/mental
limitations’ included instances of information overload and a lack of
experience to deal with a complex situation. The ‘technological
environment’ included issues such as equipment design, cockpit
display interfaces, automation and checklist layout. ‘Personal
readiness’, encompassed issues associated with inadequate training,
poor diet, and overexertion while off duty. 
The most frequently occurring category at level-3 was ‘inadequate
supervision’. Contributory factors included a failure to provide proper
training, failure to track qualifications and performance, using
untrained supervisors and loss of supervisory situation awareness.
‘Planned inadequate operations’ included issues surrounding poor crew
pairings, a failure to establish if risk outweighed benefit, and failure to
provide adequate time for briefing. In the category of ‘failure to correct
a known problem’, instances included failures to remove a known
safety hazard, failing to report unsafe tendencies, and failing to initiate
corrective actions. ‘Supervisory violations’, including authorising an
unqualified crew for flight, supervisors violating procedures, or a wilful
disregard of authority by the supervisor, was implicated in relatively
few accidents (Table 1).
At level-4, ‘resource management’ including the selection,
staffing and training of human resources at an organisational level,
excessive cost cutting and providing unsuitable equipment, was the
factor most frequently involved in accidents. ‘Organisational
processes’, which encompassed poor risk management programmes,
poor mission scheduling, failing to set clearly defined objectives or
failing to establish safety programmes, was the next most frequent
category at this level in the framework. Issues surrounding the
‘organisational climate’ including inadequacies in the chain of
command, poor delegation of authority, and inappropriate organisa-
tional customs, were involved in very few accidents.
The inter-rater reliability of the HFACS coding, calculated as a
simple percentage rate of agreement, obtained figures of between
72⋅3% and 96⋅4%, indicating acceptable reliability (Table 1).
Wiegmann and Shappell(16) suggest that the HFACS framework
bridges the gap between theory and practice by providing safety
professionals with a theoretically based tool for identifying and
classifying human errors in aviation mishaps. The tool focuses on
both latent and active failures and their inter-relationships, and it
facilitates the identification of the underlying causes of human error.
The objective of the first stage of the study was to identify any
deficiencies which may be amenable to rectification through the
development of a pilot training programme.
2.2 Method
The data were derived from the narrative descriptions of accidents
occurring in the ROC Air Force between 1978 and 2002. The data set
comprised of 523 accidents investigated during this 25-year period. 
This study used the HFACS framework as described by Wiegmann
and Shappell(4) to analyse the accident data. Each accident report was
coded independently by two investigators. The investigators were
trained on the HFACS framework together for 10 hours to ensure that
they achieved a detailed and accurate understanding to the categories in
the HFACS. The presence or the absence of each HFACS category was
assessed in each report narrative. To avoid over-representation from
any single accident, each HFACS category was counted a maximum of
only once per accident. The count acted simply as an indicator of
presence or absence of each of the 18 categories in a given accident. 
2.3 Results
The 523 accidents analysed included 1,762 instances of human error
recorded using the HFACS framework. Acts at the level of ‘unsafe
acts of operators’ were involved in 725 (41⋅1%) of cases; the
‘preconditions for unsafe acts’ level was as a causal factor in 552
(31⋅3%) instances; the ‘unsafe supervision’ level was involved in
221 (12⋅5%) of accidents, and the ‘organisational influences’ level in
the HFACS model was a factor in 264 (15%) cases. 
2.3.1 Accident characteristics
Fighter aircraft were involved in 353 (67⋅5%) accidents, training
aircraft in 113 (21⋅6%) accidents, and cargo aircraft were involved in
57 (10⋅9%) accidents; Cadet pilots were involved in 30 (5⋅7%)
accidents, second lieutenants in ten (1⋅9%), first lieutenants in 92
(17⋅6%), captains in 144 (27⋅5%), majors in 148 (28⋅3%) and
lieutenant colonel (or above) were involved in 70 (13⋅4%) accidents.
Accidents occurred in all flight phases and missions(17).
2.3.2 Accident causal factors identified using the 
HFACS framework
At level-1, ‘skill-based errors’ exhibited the highest frequency of
occurrence in the HFACS framework. These included actions such as
inappropriate stick and rudder co-ordination, excessive use of flight
controls, glide path not maintained, and adopting an improper airspeed
or altitude. ‘Decision errors’ had the second highest rate of observa-
tions. Instances in this category included, selecting inappropriate
strategies to perform a mission, improper in-flight planning, making an
inappropriate decision to abort a take-off or landing, or using improper
remedial actions in an emergency. The category of ‘violations’
included intentionally ignoring standard operating procedures (SOPs);
neglecting SOPs and applying improper SOPs. The category of
‘perceptual errors’ exhibited the lowest frequency of occurrence. This
category included spatial disorientation, experiencing visual illusions,
making incorrect estimations of distance and descent rate during the
approach, and vertigo during tactical manoeuvres (see Table 1).
At level-2 of the HFACS framework, instances of causal factors in
the ‘adverse mental states’ category included issues such as over-
confidence, stress, loss of situational awareness, distraction, and task
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Table 1
The frequency and percentage of accident and inter-rater relia-
bility of HFACS categories (ranked in terms of frequency of
occurrence) derived from Li and& Harris(17)
Categories of HFACS HFACS Frequency Percentage 
level of agreement
occurrence
Skilled-based errors 1 226 83⋅4%
Decision errors 1 223 81⋅5%
Adverse mental states 2 184 86⋅0%
Resource management 4 184 86⋅4%
Inadequate supervision 3 177 89⋅7%
Violations 1 160 84⋅9%
Crew resource management 2 146 89⋅7%
Perceptual errors 1 116 85⋅1%
Organisational process 4 76 87⋅4%
Physical environment 2 74 92⋅2%
Physical/mental limitation 2 73 90⋅4%
Technology environment 2 44 89⋅9%
Personal readiness 2 29 72⋅3%
Planned inadequate operations 3 24 94⋅6%
Failed correct a known problem 3 12 95⋅8%
Supervisory violation 3 8 96⋅2%
Organisational climate 4 4 96⋅4%
Adverse physiological states 2 2 96⋅4%
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ADM mnemonic method for each of the six basic decision types
identified by Orasanu(34) as an essential step in the design and devel-
opment of an effective training course. 
3.2 Method
3.2.1 Participants
A total of 60 instructor pilots with between 1,175 and 10,000 hours
of flying experience were recruited. Their mean flying experience
was 3,788 hours in the ROC Air Force Academy. The age of
participants ranged between 32 and 54 years, with an average of 42
years. 
3.2.2 ADM mnemonics
Five ADM mnemonic-based methods that could potentially form the
basis of the ADM training programme were selected from a review
of the literature. These were:
● SHOR: The SHOR mnemonic-method(35) consists of four steps:
stimuli, hypotheses, options, and response. It was originally
developed for use by US Air Force tactical command and control
personnel, for making decisions requiring near-real-time
reactions involving threat warning, rescheduling and other types
of dynamic modification.
● PASS: The PASS mnemonic-method(36) consists of four steps:
problem identification, acquire information, survey strategy,
select strategy. It was originally developed by a civil airline
(Delta) to train pilots as part of a CRM training programme. 
● SOAR: The SOAR mnemonic-based decision making method(37)
comprises of four steps, situation, options, act, repeat. It was
originally developed for glider pilots. It has the strength of
encouraging the repeating of the evaluation of a changing
situation after the initial actions have been made. 
● FOR-DEC: The FOR-DEC mnemonic-based method(38),
developed from the contents of a Lufthansa CRM-course,
comprises of six steps: facts, options, risks & benefits, decision,
execution, check. It incorporates an analysis of risk and benefits
to handle situations including the effects of time pressure, contin-
ually changing conditions, distraction, and incomplete infor-
mation.
● DESIDE: The DESIDE mnemonic method(39) also comprises of
six steps, detect, estimate, set safety objectives, identify, do,
evaluate. The DESIDE method is a practical adaptation of the
conflict-theory model of Janis and Mann(40).
3.2.3 Scenario selection
Six scenarios, taken from ROC Air Force accidents and incidents
corresponding to the six types of decisions described by Orasanu(34),
were used as stimulus material. These were:
1. Go/no go decision: When operating a Northrop F-5E, the No 2
wingman has to make a decision as the No 1 (Leader) abandons a
tactical formation take-off at 145kt.
2. Recognition-primed decision: F-5E right engine fails as a result
of foreign object damage just as the nose gear leaves the ground
at the speed 165kt.
3. Response selection decision: No 4 in a tactical formation of 
F-5Es is required to make a decision when No 1 (Leader)
becomes lost in cloud during formation flight (3ft distance
between wing tips of the four fighters).
4. Resource management decisions: F-5E leader (No 1) of four
aircraft needs to make a decision for the No 3 and No 4 aircraft
when a ‘no joy’ call (no visual contact with No 1 and No 2) is
made and No 2 calls ‘one opposing target approaching at 12
2.4 Discussion
‘Skill-based errors’ had the highest rate of occurrence (43⋅2%)
which included actions such as inappropriate stick and rudder
coordination, excessive use of flight controls, and adopting an
improper airspeed or altitude. ‘Decision errors’ had the second
highest rate of occurrence (42⋅6%) which included instances of
improper in-flight planning, making an inappropriate decision to
abort a take-off or landing, or using improper remedial actions in an
emergency. The frequency of occurrence of both ‘skill-based errors’
(226) and ‘decision errors’ (223) was very similar. The initial
training programmes for cadet pilots focus almost solely on factors
at the skill-based level. There is no ‘decision making’ training
programme in the ROC Air Force. Therefore, these data would
suggest the need to address this issue with some urgency when
training military pilots.
The importance of aeronautical decision making (ADM) has long
been recognised as critical to the safe operation of aircraft(18). In a
further analysis of this data set it was observed that decision errors
were often preceded by instances of poor CRM(19). A similar trend
has also been observed in commercial aircraft accidents(20). Aviation
psychologists and human factors specialists have investigated ADM
for pilots and the results have strongly suggested that ADM can be
improved by training(20-25). The results from this first phase suggest
that there is a need for military pilots to undergo decision making
training to improve aviation safety. However, if such a training
programme is to be maximally effective the most appropriate
decision making approach needs to be identified.
3.0 INVESTIGATING THE SUITABILITY 
OF ADM MNEMONICS IN TACTICAL 
SETTINGS
3.1 Introduction
There is a great variability in the nature of the tactical tasks
confronting a military pilot(24). Fighter pilots make important
decisions often using ambiguous information, while under great risk
and with very little time. Therefore, decision aids and training are
required to provide these pilots with the necessary skills. It has been
observed that the majority of fatal crashes are attributable to decision
errors rather than perceptual or action errors(25). The results of study
one supported this observation. It has consistently been found that
ADM can be improved with training(25-33). However, Orasanu(32) has
pointed out that there was no evidence to support the development of
generic training techniques to improve all-purpose decision making
skills, as there were different component skills involved in making
six different basic types of decisions. These six types of decision
included go/no go decisions; recognition-primed decisions; response
selection decisions; resource management decisions; non-diagnostic
procedural decisions; and creative problem-solving. As a result it
was thought unlikely that any one single training method could
improve all decision making. 
There are a number of strategies (often embodied in mnemonics
or acronyms) developed by aviation researchers and used by pilots
as a simple guide to structure in-flight decision making. For
economy of space the strategies used in this research are described in
the method section. The common aim of these techniques is to form
a systematic approach to decision making that is less affected by
human nature(25). Such methods could potentially produce a basis for
an effective training programme for military pilots, however, there is
lack of research investigating the efficacy of these ADM
mnemonics. Furthermore if an ADM training programme is to be
effective the most appropriate decision making strategy for each
decision making situation has to be identified. 
The aim of this second study is to identify the most appropriate
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analysis of variance: equivalent χ2 = 18⋅975, df = 4, p = 0⋅001).
Further examination of the relationship among those five methods by
using post-hoc Wilcoxon’s signed ranks test, found that five pairs of
variables were differed significantly: FOR-DEC vs SHOR (z =
–3⋅253, p = 0⋅001); SOAR vs SHOR (z = –1⋅996, p = 0⋅046);
DESIDE vs SHOR (z = –3⋅515, p = 0⋅000); FOR-DEC vs PASS (z =
–2⋅485, p = 0⋅013); DESIDE vs PASS (z = –2⋅505, p = 0⋅012). 
In the response selection decision making scenario the highest
ranked mnemonic method was DESIDE, followed by SHOR, PASS,
SOAR, and FOR-DEC. However, there was no significant difference
between these five ADM methods (Friedman’s non-parametric
analysis of variance: equivalent χ2 = 5⋅73, df = 4, p = 0⋅220). 
From the analysis of the instructors’ responses, the highest ranked
mnemonic-based method in the resource management decision
making scenario was FOR-DEC, followed by DESIDE, SHOR,
PASS, and SOAR. As before, there were no significant differences
between these methods (Friedman’s non-parametric analysis of
variance: equivalent χ2 = 1⋅851, df = 4, p = 0⋅763). 
The highest ranked ADM method in the non-diagnostic proce-
dural decision making scenario was DESIDE, followed by FOR-
DEC, PASS, SOAR and SHOR. There was a statistically significant
difference between these ADM methods (Friedman’s non-parametric
analysis of variance: equivalent χ2 = 20⋅405, df = 4, p = 0⋅000).
Further examination of the relationship among these five mnemonic-
based methods found that five pairs of variables were significantly
different from each other: PASS vs SHOR (z = –2⋅085, p = 0⋅037);
FOR-DEC vs SHOR (z = –2⋅973, p = 0⋅003); DESIDE vs SHOR (z =
–2⋅651, p = 0⋅008); SOAR vs FOR-DEC (z = –2⋅917, p = 0⋅004);
DESIDE vs SOAR (z = –2⋅519, p = 0⋅012). 
Finally, in the creative problem-solving decision making scenario
the highest ranked method was again SHOR, followed by for-DEC,
DESIDE, SOAR and PASS. There was no significant difference
between these methods (Friedman’s non-parametric analysis of
variance: equivalent χ2 = 1⋅719, df = 4, p = 0⋅787). 
3.4 Discussion
Inspection of the results in Table 2 indicates that the SHOR
mnemonic was thought to be the best ADM training mnemonic
method in three of the four scenarios where fast responses were
thought to be required. PASS was regarded as the best ADM training
mnemonic-based method in the go/no go decision making scenario.
Both SHOR and PASS were thought to be useful where a quick
response is required. Both methods are simple, and were regarded by
instructors as the best methods for rule-based decisions (condition-
action rules). Overall, SHOR, DESIDE and FOR-DEC were
regarded as good for making knowledge-based decisions (for well-
defined problems) including response selection decisions and
resource management decisions. However, only SHOR and DESIDE
were regarded as acceptable methods for making knowledge-based
decisions where the problems were ill-defined. These situations were
encompassed in the non-diagnostic procedural decision scenario and
creative problem-solving decision scenario. The instructor pilots’
comments suggested that SHOR had the required characteristics to
deal with urgent situations as it promoted quick responses. It was
simple and easy to remember; it fitted the constraints inherent in
time-limited and critical situations; it matched the general format of
a pre-flight briefing; it was easy to put into practice; and it was
thought that its logical procedures promoted safe action. As SHOR is
basically an extension of the stimulus-response (S-R) paradigm of
classical behaviourist psychology, it explicitly addresses the
requirement to deal with two aspects of uncertainty in the decision
making process; information input uncertainty (relating to
hypothesis generation and evaluation) and consequence-of-action
uncertainty(35) (which creates the requirement for option generation
and evaluation).
DESIDE was evaluated as being the best ADM method to use
when making response selection decisions and non-diagnostic proce-
o’clock with same altitude’. This occurs during practice of a two
versus two engagement (air combat manoeuvre).
5. Non-diagnostic procedural decisions: Both the leader and
wingman in a formation of F-5Es are unable to land at home-base
in a ‘bingo’ (low fuel) situation during instrument flight in bad
weather.
6. Creative problem-solving: When flying an F-5F both left and
right generators fail at the same time during a tactical manoeuvre.
3.2.4 Procedure
Each mnemonic method was evaluated using a structured rating
form in terms of its suitability for situation assessment; risk
management; response time; and applicability using a nine-point
Likert-type scale (with a high score of 9 and a low score of 1).
Supporting material was provided describing the requirements of
each step in each of the mnemonic methods. The ADM rating forms
were distributed to instructors in the Training Division, ROC Air
Force Academy, and completed instruments were returned the next
day. All instructors were fluent in the English language. None of the
instructors had any previous experience in employing these struc-
tured decision making methods. 
As a result of the length of the scenarios and the number of ratings
required each instructor only evaluated ADM decision techniques in
three scenarios selected randomly from the total of six. To eliminate
order effects, the five ADM methods were presented in a randomised
order in each scenario. 
3.3 Results
In total, 180 ratings were made of the five ADM methods on the
dimensions of situation assessment, risk management, response time,
and applicability. A total of 29 ratings were made concerning the
suitability of the ADM mnemonics in the go/no go scenario; 35
ratings in the recognition-primed decision scenario; 32 ratings in the
response selection decision making scenario; 22 ratings in the
resource management scenario; 32 ratings in the non-diagnostic
procedural decision making scenario and 30 ratings were received
concerning the suitability of the ADM methods in the creative
problem-solving scenario. 
The rank order of the instructors’ ratings on each dimension for
each ADM mnemonic-based methods in the six decision making
situations used and the overall rank order of the summated scale
scores are presented in Table 2.
3.3.1 Treatment of data
For each participant an overall score for each mnemonic method in
each scenario was created by summing the scores across these four
scales giving a range of between 4 (low suitability) to 36 (high
suitability). For statistical analysis using Friedman’s non-parametric
Analysis of Variance, the summated ratings of each ADM method in
each scenario were then converted to ranking data, from 1 (highest
suitability) to 5 (lowest suitability) — see Table 2. 
3.3.2 Statistical analysis
The highest ranking of suitability for the ADM methods in the go/no
go decision scenario was received by PASS followed by FOR-DEC,
DESIDE, SHOR, and SOAR. There was, however, no significant
difference between these five ADM methods (Friedman’s non-
parametric analysis of variance: equivalent χ2 = 1⋅284, df = 4, p =
0⋅864). 
In the recognition-primed decision making scenario, the highest
ranked mnemonic-based method was SHOR, followed by PASS,
SOAR, FOR-DEC, and DESIDE. There was a significant difference
between the five ADM methods (Friedman’s non-parametric
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making training that encompass all the requirements of these six
basic decision making situations. Instructor opinions indicate that
SHOR(35) was regarded as being the best for time-limited and urgent
situations; DESIDE(39) was regarded as being superior for guiding
knowledge-based decisions needing more comprehensive consider-
ation. To optimise decision making training effectiveness it was
regarded as being necessary to instruct pilots both with regard to the
operation of the individual techniques and in recognising which
technique was most appropriate to apply in a given circumstance. 
3.5 ADM training course
SHOR and DESIDE mnemonic-based decision making methods
formed the basis of the ADM training programme. The training
programme commenced with an introduction to ADM theory. This
was followed by a description of the content and method of appli-
dural decisions (see Table 2). These are non-emergent situations and
have no immediately dangerous threats. Pilots have time to think
more extensively about their actions. The qualitative data elicited
from the instructor pilots’ showed that DESIDE had the necessary
characteristics to deal with non-urgent situations as a result of its
good situation assessment and risk management dimensions. It
prompted a comprehensive approach in terms of the number of
factors that it encompassed in the decision making process; it was
regarded as providing a specific and clear approach to analyse a
situation and it possessed a logical order that was easy to remember.
However, it did require more time to undertake the required steps
and analyse and respond to a changing situation. As a result the
instructor pilots advised that practice using DESIDE on a simulator
was important if the technique was to be of use when dealing with a
real, in-flight situation. 
The results from study two suggest that just two mnemonic-based
methods had the potential to form a suitable basis for a decision
NUMBER THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL APRIL 2007
Table 2
Instructors’ rankings on the four dimensions of suitability of the five ADM mnemonic methods in the six basic decision making scenarios.
(Data taken from Li and Harris(41).
Scenarios ADM Situation Risk Response Applicability Overall 
Method assessment management time ranking for  
summated scale
1
Go/no go SHOR 3 4 2 2 4=
decisions PASS 1 2 1 1 1
FOR-DEC 4 3 4 4 2
SOAR 5 5 3 5 4=
DESIDE 2 1 5 2 3
2
Recognition- SHOR 1 1 1 1 1
primed PASS 4 3 3 2 2
decisions FOR-DEC 1 4 4 5 4
SOAR 3 4 2 4 3
DESIDE 5 2 5 3 5
3
Response SHOR 3 5 3 3 2
selection PASS 4 3 4 4 3
decisions FOR-DEC 2 4 5 2 5
SOAR 5 2 2 4 4
DESIDE 1 1 1 1 1
4
Resource SHOR 1 3 1 3 3=
management PASS 5 5 5 5 3=
decisions FOR-DEC 3 2 1 1 1
SOAR 4 4 1 4 5
DESIDE 1 1 4 2 2
5
Non-diagnostic SHOR 4 5 3 4 5
procedural PASS 3 3 2 2 3
decisions FOR-DEC 1 1 4 3 2
SOAR 5 4 5 5 4
DESIDE 2 2 1 1 1
6
Creative SHOR 3 2 1 3 1
problem- PASS 4 2 2 5 5
solving FOR-DEC 1 1 3 1 2
SOAR 5 5 4 1 4
DESIDE 2 2 5 4 3
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4.2 Method
4.2.1 Participants
A total of 41 male cadet pilots from ROC Air Force Tactical
Training Wings participated in the study. The flying experience of
participants was between 220 and 354 hours with an average of 292
hours. Participants were randomly divided into two groups, 21 pilots
in experimental group which underwent training on the short ADM
programme, and 20 pilots in control group who did not receive any
training. 
4.2.3 Evaluation scenarios for pre-training and post-
training evaluation
As a result of time and resource constraints only three different types
of decision making scenario were assessed in this phase. These were
scenarios requiring participants to make recognition-primed
decisions, non-diagnostic procedural decisions and engage in
creative problem solving. 
To develop scenarios for the simulator and pencil and paper
evaluations, three focus groups were conducted, one for each
decision making situation. The purpose of these focus groups was to
verify that the scenarios, three pre-ADM training and three post-
training, developed from the ROCAF accidents database, corre-
sponded to the appropriate types of decision making situation and
were of equivalent difficulty. Each focus group comprised of one
human factors specialist and three senior instructor pilots. To negate
practice effects, different (but equivalent) scenarios were used in the
evaluations pre- and post ADM training. These focus groups also
ensured that enough detail was available in the scenarios to
meaningfully evaluate the decision making performance of pilots.
These scenarios developed were as follows.
4.2.3.1 Recognition-primed decision making scenario
Pre-training: As described in study two
Post-training: F-5E solo, after taking off at 500 feet, pilot hears two
unusual sounds from the engines and feels the aircraft shake. Engine
exhaust gas temperature is increased, and RPM decreased.
4.2.3.2 Non-diagnostic procedural decision making scenario
Pre-training: As described in study two
Post-training: When an F-5E pilot is finishing basic fighting
manoeuvre training, the ground intercept controller reports that
home base weather is worsening. Surplus fuel is down to only
1,400lb. The pilot asks for weather conditions at alternative airports.
4.2.3.3 Creative problem solving decision making scenario
Pre-training: As described in study two.
Post-training: When lowering the landing gear while on the down-
wind leg the landing gear shaft warning light illuminates, indicating
the nose landing gear is abnormal.
4.2.4 Research design
Participants were randomly divided into two groups, an experimental
group and a control group. Both groups participated in an initial set
of baselining trials in both the flight simulator trials and in the
knowledge-based pencil-and-paper tests to evaluate their decision
making skills. After these initial trials the experimental group
attended the four-hour ‘ADM training programme for military
pilots’. Both groups then participated in a further set of trials to
further evaluate their in-flight decision making performance. 
cation of the SHOR and DESIDE ADM mnemonic-based methods
and advice concerning which approach was most suitable in any
given situation. Following this, participants practiced in the
classroom the application of SHOR and DESIDE in flight situations
exemplifying the six basic types of decision making scenario
described by Orasanu(34). Finally, the application of ADM in military
aviation was described and the participants were de-briefed. The
ADM training programme lasted approximately four hours in total.
4.0 EVALUATION THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
ADM TRAINING INTERVENTION
4.1 Introduction
It is vital that a training programme is assessed to determine if it is
achieving its goals(42). The third study evaluated the effectiveness of
the short ADM training course developed. This was undertaken by
the evaluation of trainees’ decision making process based on the
underpinning decision making components of situation assessment
and risk management. Both the decision making process and the
product of the decision making were evaluated, the former through
the use of a simple, knowledge-based pencil and paper based test
and the latter from observation and instructor evaluation of trainee
performance in a series of simulator trials. 
In the dynamic tactical environment, effective decision making is
highly dependent on situation awareness. Situation awareness and
decision making are closely related and in both instances, situation
assessment is a fundamental precursor(26,43). Situation assessment has
been described as the process by which the state of situation
awareness is achieved and has been identified as a critical
component of decision making(44). 
For military pilots operating in a hostile environment, the normal
hazards of aviation are further compounded by the enemy’s intent
for the destruction of the aircraft. Risk and time pressure are situa-
tional variables that further influence the decision making process,
as risk and time pressure may call for an immediate response from a
pilot irrespective of whether or not the problem was fully
understood(45). Risk management should be a key part of the decision
making process(46). To manage threats, pilots must first assess the
risks associated with them. Risk assessment feeds into decision
making in two ways: during the assessment of the precipitating
threats and in evaluating potential courses of action(47). 
Time pressure has several important implications for decision
making. Decision makers will often experience high levels of stress
and their thinking will often shift toward the direction of using less
complicated reasoning strategies(48). Military pilots often make
important decisions using ambiguous information under great risk
and time pressure. Therefore, decision aids and training are required
to provide pilots with the necessary skills to make quick and
accurate situation assessments(49). 
There were several approaches to the evaluation of training that
differ in terms of aims, criteria, and methods. The traditional
approach to evaluation has as its goal to identify whether training
meets its training objectives and if it doesn’t how the training
programme should be modified(50). The role of evaluation is to
correct and manage training design and this is integral to the instru-
mental system development (ISD) approach. Feedback from evalu-
ation may result in revision to either or both of the training
objectives or training design. The criteria used for this type of evalu-
ation concern both the processes of training development and the
products of training as manifested in performance, at both individual
and organisational levels. To re-iterate slightly, the purpose of this
phase was to evaluate the effectiveness of the ADM training
programme through a flight simulator-based experiment and by a
knowledge-based evaluation of trainees using paper and paper tests.
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4.3 Results
4.3.1 RecognitiFon-primed decisions
With regard to performance in the flight simulator there was an effect
approaching statistical significance on situation assessment performance
before and after ADM training (Table 3). Pilots tended to perform better
during the second set of trials (Table 4). However, there was no corre-
sponding significant difference observed on the pencil-and-paper based
tests. The group that had received ADM training also significantly
outperformed the group that had not received training on situation
assessment performance in the flight simulator but there was again no
corresponding significant difference between the groups on the pencil-
and-paper tests. The interaction term between the trained/untrained group
and before training/after training trials was non-significant on the
simulator tests but there was a significant interaction on the pencil-and-
paper tests. The group that had received ADM training showed signifi-
cantly greater gains in rated situation assessment performance during the
second set of trials compared to the untrained group. 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of risk
management before and after ADM training on the simulator trials,
however there was no significant difference on the pencil-and-paper
The simulator trials and pencil-and-paper tests used the recog-
nition-primed decision, non-diagnostic procedural decision, and
creative problem solving scenarios. ADM performance was
evaluated on three dimensions in the simulator; situation assessment,
risk management, and response time, but only on the former two
aspects in the pencil-and-paper knowledge-based tests. Evaluations
were undertaken in the Northrop F-5E simulator from the ROCAF
Tactical Wing. After finishing the simulator trials, the participants
then undertook the pencil-and-paper knowledge tests. 
As described previously, to negate practice effects, different
scenarios were used pre- and post ADM training. To eliminate order
effects, the three scenarios were presented in a randomised order during
both the pre-test and post-test trials. Pilots’ performance was evaluated
on three dimensions (situation assessment, risk management and
response time) by a qualified flight simulator instructor. These dimen-
sions were derived from the earlier study to select the most appropriate
ADM training mnemonic methods. Each aspect of performance was
rated using a nine-point Likert-type scale (with a high score of 9 and a
low score of 1, or in the case of the dimension of response time a score
of 1 indicating the fastest and, 9 is the slowest). To control inter-rater
reliability, the same instructor was used for all participants. 
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Table 3
Summary of statistical analyses of the main effects of before/after training; main effects of trained/untrained groups and interaction effects
on both the simulator trials and pencil-and-paper tests on the dimensions of situation assessment, risk management, and response time
across three of decision making scenarios. All analyses of variance have 1 and 39 degrees of freedom. Statistically significant results 
(p < 0⋅05) are entered in bold type. Results approaching statistical significance p < 0⋅10) are entered in an italic typeface. 
na indicates not applicable
Six basic types Dimensions of Main effect of Main effect of Interaction effects 
of decisions evaluation before/after training trained/untrained
S P-P S P-P S P-P
trials trials trials trials trials trials
Recognition SA F = 3⋅520 F = 0⋅927 F = 6⋅904 F = 1⋅337 F = 1⋅735 F = 9⋅555
-primed p = 0⋅068 p = 0⋅342 p = 0⋅012 p = 0⋅225 p = 0⋅195 p = 0⋅004
decisions
RM F = 12⋅467 F = 0⋅141 F = 6⋅736 F = 2⋅900 F = 2⋅248 F = 3⋅266
p = 0⋅001 p = 0⋅710 p = 0⋅013 p = 0⋅097 p = 0⋅142 p = 0⋅078
RT F = 2⋅778 na F = 0⋅013 na F = 3⋅890 na
p = 0⋅104 p = 0⋅910 p = 0⋅056
Non-diagnostic SA F = 8⋅216 F = 8⋅216 F = 2⋅484 F = 3⋅593 F = 4⋅237 F = 19⋅540
procedural p = 0⋅007 p = 0⋅007 p = 0⋅123 p = 0⋅065 p = 0⋅046 p = 0⋅000
decisions 
RM F = 6⋅761 F = 0⋅067 F = 3⋅316 F = 1⋅887 F = 7⋅743 F = 3⋅266
p = 0⋅013 p = 0⋅797 p = 0⋅076 p = 0⋅177 p = 0⋅008 p = 0⋅078
RT F = 3⋅266 na F = 1⋅753 na F = 0⋅692 na
p = 0⋅078 p = 0⋅193 p = 0⋅411
Creative SA F = 5⋅364 F = 10⋅320 F = 3⋅063 F = 0⋅187 F = 2⋅993 F = 2⋅393
problem- p = 0⋅026 p = 0⋅003 p = 0⋅088 p = 0⋅668 p = 0⋅092 p = 0⋅130
solving
RM F = 6⋅617 F = 5⋅885 F = 0⋅669 F = 0⋅162 F = 4⋅278 F = 2⋅393
p = 0⋅014 p = 0⋅020 p = 0⋅418 p = 0⋅690 p = 0⋅045 p = 0⋅130
RT F = 3⋅185 na F = 6⋅164 na F = 2⋅132 na
p = 0⋅082 p = 0⋅017 p = 0⋅152
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(Table 5). However, there was no significant difference on the
pencil-and-paper tests. There was no significance between the
trained and untrained groups on the simulator trials, however, there
was an effect verging on a significant difference on pencil-and-paper
tests. The trained group tended to outperform the untrained group.
There were significant interactions terms on both the simulator trials
and pencil-and-paper tests. The group receiving ADM training
showed significantly greater gains in performance in the second trial
compared to the untrained.
There was a significant difference on flight simulator performance
on the dimension of risk management before and after training. The
results indicated pilots’ performance was significantly better on the
second trials. There was, however, no significant difference in risk
management performance before and after training on the pencil-
and-paper tests. There was a result tending toward statistical signifi-
cance on the simulator trials between the trained and untrained
groups with the group that had received ADM training exhibiting
better risk management performance than the group that had not.
There was no significant difference between the trained and
untrained group on the pencil-and-paper tests, though. Furthermore,
there was a significant interaction between the trained/untrained
group and trial on the flight simulator trials and a result verging on
tests. There was a significant difference in performance between the
trained and untrained group on simulator trials and a result verging on
significance on the pencil-and-paper tests. In both cases the group that
had received ADM training outperformed the other group. There was no
significant interaction term between the trained/untrained group and trial
on the simulator trials, however, there was a result approaching signifi-
cance on the pencil-and-paper tests. The trained group showed greater
gains in risk management performance in the latter trials compared to the
untrained group
There was no significant difference on rated speed of response
between trials on the flight simulator and there was also no difference
between the trained and untrained group. There was, however, a result
verging on significant with respect to the interaction term. The group that
had received ADM training tended to exhibit longer response times in the
second trial compared to the untrained group. 
4.3.2 Non-diagnostic procedural decisions 
There was a significant difference in pilots’ situation assessment
performance before and after ADM training on the simulator trials
(Table 3). Performance was better during the second set of trials
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Table 4
Means and standard deviations in performance scores in the recognition primed decision making scenario on both simulator trial and
pencil-and-paper trial. The S-prefix denotes simulator trial; the P&P prefix denotes pencil-and-paper test
Recognition-primed decisions Group N Mean Standard
Deviation
Situation Pre-test S-Trained 21 5⋅00 1⋅703
assessment P&P-Trained 5⋅43 1⋅121
S-Untrained 20 4⋅35 1⋅599
P&P-Untrained 5⋅55 1⋅234
Post-test S-Trained 21 5⋅86 1⋅526
P&P-Trained 6⋅10 0⋅944
S-Untrained 20 4⋅50 1⋅051
P&P-Untrained 5⋅20 1⋅436
Risk Pre-test S-Trained 21 4⋅48 1⋅537
management P&P-Trained 5⋅29 1⋅189
S-Untrained 20 4⋅05 0⋅945
P&P-Untrained 5⋅30 1⋅128
Post-test S-Trained 21 5⋅71 1⋅309
P&P-Trained 5⋅86 0⋅727
S-Untrained 20 4⋅55 1⋅146
P&P-Untrained 4⋅95 1⋅191
Response Pre-test S-Trained 21 4⋅67 1⋅592
time P&P-Trained na na
S-Untrained 20 5⋅35 1⋅872
P&P-Untrained na na
Post-test S-Trained 21 5⋅86 0⋅964
P&P-Trained na na
S-Untrained 20 5⋅25 1⋅446
P&P-Untrained na na
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There was again a significant difference on the dimension of
risk management before and after ADM training on both the
simulator trials and pencil-and-paper tests. Pilots in the group
receiving training exhibited superior risk management skills.
There was no significant difference in this regard between the
trained and untrained group on either the simulator trial or the
pencil-and-paper trial. There was a significant interaction term
between the trained/untrained group and trial on the simulator
trials, however, there was no significant interaction term between
the trained/untrained group and trial on pencil-and-paper trial. The
group that had received ADM training showed greater gains in
performance in the simulator trials (after training) compared to the
untrained group. 
There was a result verging on significant difference on the
dimension of response time between trials. Pilots’ response times
during the second trial were longer than the first trial. There was
also a significant difference between the trained and untrained
group. The group that had received ADM training tended to be
rated as having significantly longer response times than the group
that had not received training. There was no significant interaction
term between the main effects. 
significance on the pencil-and-paper tests. In both cases the group
that had received ADM training showed greater gains in perfor-
mance on the second trial compared to the untrained group. 
There was a significant difference on the dimension of rated speed
of response between trials showing that pilots’ response times during
the second trial in the flight simulator were significantly longer than
the first trial. However, there was no significant difference between
the trained and untrained group in this respect and there was also no
significant interaction term. 
4.3.3 Creative problem-solving
There was a significant difference on the dimension of situation
assessment before and after decision making training on both the
simulator trials and pencil-and-paper tests (Table 3). The results
showed that pilots’ situation assessment was significantly better after
ADM training (Table 6). There was no significant difference
between the groups on either the simulator trial or the pencil-and-
paper tests, although the former was verging on significance. There
was also a result approaching significance for the interaction term on
the simulator trials, however, there was no significant interaction
term on the pencil-and-paper tests.
NUMBER THE AERONAUTICAL JOURNAL APRIL 2007
Table 5
Means and standard deviations in performance scores in the non-diagnostic procedural scenario on both simulator trial and 
pencil-and-paper test. The S-prefix denotes simulator trial; the P&P prefix denotes pencil-and-paper test
Non-diagnostic procedural Group N Mean Standard
decisions deviation
Situation Pre-test S-Trained 21 4⋅38 1⋅774
assessment P&P-Trained 5⋅00 1⋅304
S-Untrained 20 4⋅55 0⋅826
P&P-Untrained 5⋅30 1⋅218
Post-test S-Trained 21 5⋅90 1⋅480
P&P-Trained 6⋅19 1⋅123
S-Untrained 20 4⋅80 1⋅196
P&P-Untrained 4⋅55 1⋅638
Risk Pre-test S-Trained 21 4⋅29 1⋅454
management P&P-Trained 4⋅95 1⋅161
S-Untrained 20 4⋅55 0⋅826
P&P-Untrained 5⋅25 1⋅070
Post-test S-Trained 21 5⋅76 1⋅375
P&P-Trained 5⋅71 0⋅956
S-Untrained 20 4⋅50 1⋅192
P&P-Untrained 4⋅60 1⋅465
Response Pre-test S-Trained 21 4⋅33 1⋅494
time P&P-Trained na na
S-Untrained 20 4⋅20 0⋅894
P&P-Untrained na na
Post-test S-Trained 21 5⋅38 1⋅244
P&P-Trained na na
S-Untrained 20 4⋅80 1⋅152
P&P-Untrained na na
3086.qxp  23/03/2007  14:17  Page 10
the pilots, allowing a more comprehensive consideration of the
situation using the DESIDE mnemonic. De-briefing of the partici-
pants and analysis of the pencil-and-paper tests also showed that the
ADM mnemonics had been applied in the correct manner. However,
situations develop quickly in a high performance jet aircraft and with
only a single pilot on board there is also often the requirement to
make a quick (but not a ‘hasty’) decision. These factors, coupled
with the often ‘individualist’ nature of fighter pilots may pre-dispose
some to utilise the quicker to apply SHOR mnemonic method in all
instances. It may be useful to undertake further research in a multi-
crew context to investigate if there is a pre-disposition in transport
pilots to use the more comprehensive DESIDE ADM mnemonic
method as a result of having fewer time or workload pressures in
some situations. 
Improvements in situation assessment and risk management
performance were, however, sometimes obtained at the expense of a
decreased speed of response. In the recognition-primed decision
making scenario, which required a rapid response, after training
pilots responses were rated as being slower than before but their
situation assessment and risk management decisions were improved.
This may be a reasonable result, as the trainees avoided a rushed, ill-
considered response, even in this situation. Similar results were also
4.4 Discussion
Overall, results from both the simulator-based trials (which assessed
the product of the ADM training programme) and the pencil-and-
paper test (which assessed the process that the trainees applied)
show gains being made in both situation assessment and risk
management skills which are attributable to the decision making
training course. Perhaps the most direct indication of the efficacy of
the ADM training course, though, lies in the significant interaction
effects obtained. These interaction terms indicate disproportionate
gains in situation assessment and risk management performance on
the second trial (post ADM training) in the participant group that
received ADM instruction (see Table 3). 
Further data obtained in the structured de-briefing of the trainee
pilots after each simulator trial and the results of the pencil-and-
paper tests clearly showed that the vast majority of pilots who had
received ADM training applied the most appropriate ADM
mnemonic method in a given scenario. The SHOR mnemonic was
most often applied in the recognition-primed decision making
scenario (which required a fast response) and DESIDE was most
commonly used in the non-diagnostic procedural decision making
scenario and in the creative problem-solving situation. In both the
latter scenarios, there were no immediate time or fuel pressures on
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Table 6
Means and standard deviations in performance scores in the creative problem-solving scenario on both simulator trial 
and pencil-and-paper test. The S-prefix demotes simulator trial; the P&P prefix denotes pencil-and-paper test
Creative problem-solving Group N Mean Standard
deviation
Situation Pre-test S-Trained 21 5⋅05 1⋅830
assessment P&P-Trained 4⋅71 1⋅347
S-Untrained 20 5⋅00 1⋅686
P&P-Untrained 4⋅90 1⋅483
Post-test S-Trained 21 6⋅43 1⋅076
P&P-Trained 5⋅71 1⋅007
S-Untrained 20 5⋅20 1⋅704
P&P-Untrained 5⋅25 1⋅020
Risk Pre-test S-Trained 21 4⋅86 1⋅682
management P&P-Trained 4⋅71 1⋅347
S-Untrained 20 5⋅15 1⋅843
P&P-Untrained 4⋅95 1⋅761
Post-test S-Trained 21 6⋅24 1⋅375
P&P-Trained 5⋅67 0⋅966
S-Untrained 20 5⋅30 1⋅380
P&P-Untrained 5⋅15 1⋅226
Response Pre-test S-Trained 21 5⋅19 1⋅778
time P&P-Trained na na
S-Untrained 20 4⋅80 1⋅735
P&P-Untrained na na
Post-test S-Trained 21 6⋅19 1⋅167
P&P-Trained na na
S-Untrained 20 4⋅90 1⋅021
P&P-Untrained na na
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obtained in the other two scenarios. Unlike the recognition-primed
decision making situation, though, in these cases an immediate decision
was not required, hence sacrifices in speed of response were not so
critical. However, as before, it can be suggested that ‘better’ decisions
were being made (in terms of situation assessment and risk
management) at the expense of these longer response times. The results
from the pencil-and-paper tests would support this observation. It is
also possible that further training and practice may speed this process. 
The nature of a decision depends on the requirements of the tasks
and the conditions of the surrounding environment. If the evolving
situation is not coincident with established SOPs or previous
experience, pilots must to conduct an analysis of the problem and
devise a solution. These results add support to the results of earlier
research that suggested that ADM was trainable(21,22,26,29,31,33). In the
second phase of this study the opinions of instructor pilots identified
SHOR(35) as potentially being the best ADM mnemonic in a time-
limited situation and DESIDE(39) was thought to be superior for more
complex, knowledge-based decisions where more time was available.
This last phase provides supports the conclusions of the earlier survey
and provides empirical evidence to demonstrate that pilots trained in
the use of these techniques actually make better in-flight decisions in
critical situations. 
In this study decision making was considered as a standalone skill.
However, aspects of ADM, such as risk management, are also key
components in many CRM courses. Indeed the FOR-DEC mnemonic-
based method(38) was developed from the contents of a CRM. Although
this study concentrated on pilots of single-set fighter aircraft, teamwork
(in the broadest sense) is also a fundamental skill required of these
pilots. Although they may fly a single seat aircraft, they never fly alone.
It is suggested that improvements in ADM skills would also produce
concomitant benefits in CRM skills, both in single and multi-crew
aircraft.
5.0 OVERALL DISCUSSION AND
CONCLUSION
The simple, short, cost-effective training programme in the appro-
priate use of ADM mnemonic methods devised in this study
produced significant gains in decision making performance. Such a
course may easily be integrated into current CRM or simulator-based
training programmes. 
This paper demonstrates how through conducting a structured
human factors assessment of accidents and incidents a well-targeted
training programme may be constructed. The use of the interservice
procedures for instructional system development (IPISD) training
development model also ensures that the ADM course developed is
properly evaluated at all stages to further guarantee its effectiveness.
Kirkpatrick(51) suggests that training effectiveness should be
examined by both proximal and distal measures. In this case the
proximal measures show significant gains in the underpinning skills
of decision making, however, it still needs to be established if these
performance gains continue to be evident at a later date during actual
operations. This will be established in the near future, however, the
initial results would seem to be most promising.
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